Dostoyevsky, Bernanos, and Knowing Joy as the Unknown by Lévai, Ruth Karin
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 
ISSN 1481-4374 
Purdue University Press ©Purdue University 
Volume 18 (2016) Issue 1 Article 6 
Dostoyevsky, Bernanos, and Knowing Joy as the Unknown 
Ruth Karin Lévai 
Eötvös Loránd University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb 
 Part of the Comparative Literature Commons, and the European Languages and Societies Commons 
Dedicated to the dissemination of scholarly and professional information, Purdue University Press selects, develops, and distributes 
quality resources in several key subject areas for which its parent university is famous, including business, technology, health, 
veterinary medicine, and other selected disciplines in the humanities and sciences. 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the humanities and 
social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative literature and the field of cultural 
studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English 
Language and Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities Index 
(Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of 
America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monograph series of Books in Comparative 
Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu> 
Recommended Citation 
Lévai, Ruth Karin "Dostoyevsky, Bernanos, and Knowing Joy as the Unknown." CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and 
Culture 18.1 (2016): <https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.2877> 
This text has been double-blind peer reviewed by 2+1 experts in the field. 
The above text, published by Purdue University Press ©Purdue University, has been downloaded 219 times as of 11/
07/19. 
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact 
epubs@purdue.edu for additional information. 
This is an Open Access journal. This means that it uses a funding model that does not charge readers or their institutions for 
access. Readers may freely read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of articles. This journal is covered 
under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
    UNIVERSITY PRESS <http://www.thepress.purdue.edu> 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture  
 
ISSN 1481-4374 <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb> 
Purdue University Press ©Purdue University 
 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the 
humanities and social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative 
literature and the field of cultural studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." In addition to the 
publication of articles, the journal publishes review articles of scholarly books and publishes research material in its 
Library Series. Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English Language and 
Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities 
Index (Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Langua-
ge Association of America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monog-
raph series of Books in Comparative Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu> 
 
 
Volume 18 Issue 1 (March 2016) Article 6 
Ruth Karin Lévai, 
"Dostoyevsky, Bernanos, and Knowing Joy as the Unknown" 
<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol18/iss1/6> 
 




Abstract: In her article "Dostoyevsky, Bernanos, and Knowing Joy as the Unknown" Ruth Karin Lévai 
analyzes the concept of joy in Fyodor Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov and Georges Bernanos's 
The Diary of a Country Priest. Lévai follows five main aspects of the experience of joy common to the 
characters of both novels: 1) joy as prerequisite to true freedom, 2) joy as risk, 3) joy as the ability to 
love, 4) joy as the ability to give and receive prosaic gifts, and 5) joy as community. Lévai argues that 
in both works joy is portrayed as a starting point rather than a destination and that it grows out of 
knowledge rather than circumstance. Further, she posits that Dostoyevsky's and Bernanos's under-
standing of joy was shaped by their Christian faith. 
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Ruth Karin LÉVAI 
 
Dostoyevsky, Bernanos, and Knowing Joy as the Unknown 
 
The novels of Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Georges Bernanos, among their many other insights, are rich 
in scenes of unbounded joy and ecstasy. Some of the most memorable moments of joy in The Broth-
ers Karamazov occur when Mitya Karamazov is in prison, not a likely place for discovering joy. Yet I 
believe the key lies in something that Mitya says to Alyosha shortly after his arrest: "I see the sun, 
and if I don't see the sun, I know it's there. And there's a whole life in that, in knowing that the sun is 
there" (556). Similarly, the curate of Ambricourt in Bernanos's novel, before his ride on the motorcy-
cle, one of his greatest experiences of joy prior to his painful and untimely death, says that "by a pre-
sentiment which I cannot explain, I also understood, I knew that God did not wish me to die without 
knowing something of that risk — just enough, maybe, for my sacrifice to be complete when the time 
came ... for one poor short minute I was to taste that glory" (235-36). In both cases the emphasis is 
on the knowledge each had above and beyond the conditions in which they found themselves, namely 
the knowledge of some fixed and absolutely unchanging point outside themselves, a will not their own, 
a source that would continue to sustain them and all other life although for a time eclipsed from their 
vision out of the reach of their senses. Mitya knows the sun to be constantly generating warmth and 
light, stimulating growth and new birth in nature, and this is enough not only to keep him from des-
pair, but to inspire and elate him. The curate knows god's intentions to be consistently good and that 
despite the brevity of his individual life his own pleasure and suffering play a part in the greater spir-
itual life that god will continue to direct even after he is gone. Their knowledge is solidified by their 
trust in an innate order. 
In the study at hand, I explore how the source of joy is demonstrated as being one of knowledge 
rather than one of circumstance in Dostoyevsky and Bernanos. As the curate of Ambricourt writes in 
his journal, "how is it that we fail to realize that the mask of pleasure, stripped of all hypocrisy, is that 
of anguish?" (124). Good fortune, comfort, felicitous circumstances only serve as a cover to a desper-
ation waiting to burst forth just beneath the surface. Pleasure can never pretend to the heights at-
tained by unwavering knowledge of an eternal constant. Within the framework of this hypothesis I 
examine The Brothers Karamazov and the Diary of a Country Priest and discuss five aspects of this 
source of knowledge: 1) experiencing joy as a prerequisite to freedom rather than a product of it, 2) 
experiencing joy as risk, 3) experiencing joy as the ability to love, 4) experiencing joy through giving 
and 5) experiencing joy through community. These, I believe, will afford a deeper understanding of 
the vision that each of the writers had of unbounded joy. 
We are rather accustomed to thinking of joy as the product of freedom coupled with the satisfac-
tion of desire. Yet both Dostoyevsky and Bernanos portray a reality in which not only does joy exist 
before freedom, it can even exist without freedom, at least that freedom which is nothing more than 
an infinity of choices and possibilities. Why must joy precede freedom? Peter Jones notes in Philosophy 
and the Novel that "Zossima asserts that it is a distortion of human nature to see freedom as the sat-
isfaction and multiplication of desires; for by thinking up desires for himself a man sets himself in 
bondage, withdraws his concern for the rest of humanity, and becomes isolated from it" (117). And 
the Inquisitor throws the following accusation in Christ's face: "Didst thou forget that man prefers 
peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil? Nothing is more se-
ductive for man than his freedom of conscience, but nothing is a greater cause of suffering" (234). 
Human nature seeks freedom in one of two ways: either in the removal of all boundaries and limits to 
the fulfillment of individual desires, the freedom of conscience, which Zossima claims leads to bondage 
and the Inquisitor cites as the greatest cause of suffering or in the willful limiting of choices and the 
surrendering of desires to a visible authority, the freedom from conscience, which makes love impos-
sible and can only lead to death. Neither of these options result in a state of ecstatic joy; rather, it 
would seem, in something like existential despair or at best indifference. Freedom is an apparent 
curse rather than a blessing. 
The Inquisitor further challenges the mute Christ with regard to the merit of the freedom he has 
paid such a high price for: "Thou didst desire man's free love, that he should follow Thee freely, en-
ticed and taken captive by Thee ... but didst thou not know he would at last reject even Thy image 
and Thy truth, if he is weighed down with the fearful burden of free choice" (234). Humanity thirsts for 
freedom without responsibility, yet it would seem that such a reality does not exist. Freedom presup-
poses the necessity of being freed from something or someone, otherwise it becomes utterly meaning-
less. Yet if the true reality of freedom entailed no responsibility before anyone, then humanity could 
not in any way be connected to life to other existent beings. And naturally people would not need to 
be freed from themselves because they themselves would have become the absolute. Thus this type 
of freedom is a logical paradox. In Bernanos's Diary of a Country Priest the countess has chosen free-
dom from conscience living outwardly piously within the confines of the Catholic Church while re-
nouncing any responsibility with regard to her daughter's suicidal intentions. The meek young priest 
unabashedly disarms her, however, claiming that "all disorder comes of the same father, the father of 
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lies ... we know there's only one kind of order, that which comes from charity" (149). By closing her 
heart to her daughter while justifying herself with religious sacrifice the countess was falling for the 
Inquistor's ploy. She was desperately trying to establish a new order, one in which knowledge of the 
eternal constant was disregarded, declared irrelevant. Yet as the curate asserts, this is no order but 
disorder. Any attempt at attaining freedom while either eschewing responsibility or denying all bound-
aries seems doomed. 
So where in Dostoyevsky's and Bernanos's texts does true freedom begin? Of what does its endur-
ing foundation consist? The curate of Ambricourt says that "we know there is only one order, that of 
love" (175), but how do we, how did he know this? What did it mean to know this? In her final letter 
to the curate, shortly before her physical death, the countess acknowledges how she "lived in the 
most horrible solitude, alone with the desperate memory of a child" (175). She describes her chief 
guilt as having been that of sinning "willfully ... against hope, every day for eleven years" (175). She 
chose to reject hope in the reality of any relationship based on unconditional love. Yet, at last, follow-
ing her powerful encounter with the curate, although she had feared surrendering her grief, feared 
resigning herself to the divine order of relational vulnerability which risked exposure to more pain, she 
allows this reality to envelop her, to become the cocoon she needed rather than the prison she had 
feared: "I'm not resigned, I'm happy. I don't want anything" (175). She experienced joy as the free-
dom to surrender desire itself. Rather than feeling herself trapped in the grip of a moral vise, con-
strained to do the right thing, the countess experienced release in relinquishing her desire for justice 
and revenge, proving the truth of the order of love. Mitya also grasped a profound connection between 
the eternal order of love, joy and freedom. Speaking of his possible prison sentence he says "Oh, yes, 
we shall be in chains and there will be no freedom, but then, in our great sorrow, we shall rise again 
to joy, without which man cannot live nor God exist, for God gives joy: it's is privilege — a grand one" 
(556). He knows that he is innocent of his father's murder, yet he is willing to take responsibility for it, 
the consequences upon himself, even the loss of his physical freedom, an utterly absurd proposition 
within the reality of either the satisfaction of desires or of avoiding guilt. Still, in his willingness to 
surrender his freedom, he finds joy just as the countess finds joy in confessing her own part in the 
pain of the world, namely that of her daughter. Each came to understand that the freedom they 
thought they possessed and needed to guard so carefully was only an illusion and was in fact the pris-
on of their fears, fear of injustice, fear of punishment, fear of the non-reality of love. Mitya and the 
countess knew the reality of the order of love by experiencing the mercy of joy. In the moment when 
they were least expecting it, when they realized they least deserved it, it was granted to them without 
their having to retain anything in their grasp. And this joy far surpassed any other reality they found 
themselves in, evidence of an order independent of the laws of time and space. 
Peter Jones writes that "it is important to note that the regenerations of Dmitri and Ivan are indi-
cated by the feeling of joy which is a necessary stage towards achieving the proper ecstasy referred to 
by Zosima" (127). Joy is the first stepping stone in the process of regeneration, the first outward sign 
that a person is being freed not from all limitations of desire, nor from responsibility, but rather from 
the disorder within. In her The Poetic Imagination of Bernanos Gerda Blumenthal emphasizes the sig-
nificance of this change of posture: "the mystery of the Incarnation begins to cast a light of its own, in 
which the earth is displayed not as humiliated but as triumphant in its very poverty. Chosen by the 
infinite divine spirit as a partner and co-creator, the earth invites and makes possible God's most 
beautiful and unpredictable inspirations" (130). In knowing their true relationship to the creator, and 
by imitating his humility, Dmitri and the countess were set free to countless beautiful and unpredicta-
ble possibilities, and this was indeed cause for joy. However, even in this new kind of freedom there is 
risk and its unpredictable element is not a harbinger of pleasant surprises alone. The risk rather than 
diminishing the original joy only intensifies it, even when, as in the case of Mikhail, Zosima's mysteri-
ous visitor, all that was risked seems to be lost. Highlighting the apparent tragedy of his case, Caryl 
Emerson notes in A New Word on the Brothers Karamazov that in the other "'foolish' acts in the novel 
(Markel's deathbed ecstasies, Zosima's ringing laughter at his duel, Alyosha's gathering of the boys 
around Ilyusha's grave), there is joy, a suspension of both judgment and resentment, a profound (if 
incomprehensible) sense of humanity's oneness ... in contrast, after Mikhail's 'action' we witness in-
creased resentment. There is recrimination, the collapse of family, the falling away of communally 
expressed love, all capped by Zosima leaving town in an aura of disgrace" (168). Can there be joy in 
such great risk and loss? It is certainly one thing to risk punishment, but to risk the integrity, the rep-
utation of one's family? Surely this is too much. Nevertheless, even before his confession, Mikhail pro-
claims to Zosima "I know it will be heaven for me, heaven, the moment I confess. Fourteen years I've 
been in hell. I want to suffer. I will take my punishment and begin to live" (285-86). Not only does 
Mikhail expect to feel relief from his burden, but he describes it in the highest possible terms of ecsta-
sy: heaven. He knows that come what may, order will begin to replace disorder within him, and he will 
begin to live. Indeed, after his confession, although his family and neighbors have been unable to 
accept the truth of it, Mikhail feels more reconciled to them than he ever had before: "I know I am 
dying, but I feel joy and peace for the first time after so many years. There was heaven in my heart 
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from the moment I had done what I had to do. Now I dare to love my children and to kiss them ... 
and now I feel God near, my heart rejoices as in Heaven" (289). 
There can be no joy in social interaction in interpersonal relationships if it is not based on truth. 
The joy of risking the truth of one's being is the starting point for meaningful connection. Any relation-
ship which has not undergone this trial by fire, which has not been risked for the sake of the truth 
cannot be a source of joy. In Bernanos's Diary of a Country Priest the elder curate de Torcy, mentor 
and friend to the younger hero of the story, describes risk as a necessary prerequisite for the exist-
ence of "supernatural conditions": "You've got to be crazy to refuse to see that the sole justification of 
inequality in the supernatural order is its risk. Our risk! Both yours and mine" (118). These supernatu-
ral conditions would seem to correspond to the elation, the "heaven" experienced by Mikhail after his 
confession. What other explanation could there be for the joy he felt in the face of such painful cir-
cumstances? Joy here was a miracle induced by risk. Later the curate of Ambricourt even goes so far 
as to call the risk involved in the experience of joy "blessed": "I realized that youth is blessed — that it 
is a risk worth running, a risk that is also blessed ... I felt happy, released, so far from everything" 
(235-37). Unlike the countess or Mikhail, the priest faces a different kind of risk, not the risk of pun-
ishment for any crimes he had committed, nor the risk of losing loved ones or the memory of them, 
but the risk of total abandon to the unknown, of losing any sense of control on the direction of his life, 
even being prepared to face death. Earlier in the novel the young curate expressed a desire to suffer, 
presumably to more closely identify with Christ: "what I wouldn't give to be able to suffer! ... no fear 
of death, it is just as indifferent to me as life ... first I was no more than a spark, an atom of the glow-
ing dust of divine charity" (106). Yet interestingly, perhaps precisely because life had become as indif-
ferent to him as death, the suffering he so much desires eludes him. The priest longs for a suffering 
which is known to him, a suffering which he can foresee, but in this there is neither joy nor risk. His 
motorcycle ride with Olivier opens his eyes to the necessity of risk "for his sacrifice to be complete … 
and by a presentiment which I cannot explain, I also understood, I knew that God did not wish me to 
die without knowing something of that risk — just enough, maybe, for my sacrifice to be complete 
when the time came. For one poor short minute I was to taste that glory" (235-36). Without risk, 
there can be no true, meaningful sacrifice or suffering. If it is only what is known that is surrendered, 
then its loss can be calculated and prepared for in advance, its eventual substitution can be undertak-
en. But when the unknown is surrendered there is no way to estimate the possible consequences or 
rewards. Risk is the seed of the tree of joy. And what greater risk than an experience wholly unfamil-
iar to us? The joy of both Mikhail and the priest soars to new heights when each abandons himself to 
the control of a will not their own, acting on the knowledge of its true purpose. 
And what, in fact, is that purpose, that it reassured Mikhail and the young curate? As the latter had 
earlier so confidently asserted to the countess that "we know there's only one kind of order, that 
which comes from charity" (149). Joy liberates as we witness in the case of Dmitri and the countess: it 
inspires us to take risks which then intensify its presence as demonstrated in the lives of Mikhail and 
the priest and joy is supremely known in the ability to love. Strikingly, both Zosima and the curate of 
Ambricourt define hell, the antithesis of joy, as the inability to love. While trying to persuade the coun-
tess of the injustice of her view of god, the priest declares that "hell is not to love any more, madame" 
(163). Likewise, Zosima recounts to his disciples that "fathers and teachers, I ponder 'What is hell?' I 
maintain that it is the suffering of being unable to love. Once in infinite existence, immeasurable in 
time and space, a spiritual creature was given on his coming to earth, the power of saying, 'I am and I 
love.' Once, only once, there was given him a moment of active living love and for that was earthly life 
given him, and with it times and seasons" (299). So the highest expression of the experience of joy is 
an imitation of that principle which orders reality. Alyosha becomes convinced of this truth following 
his own encounter with the risk and pain of the unknown, the death of his beloved teacher and mentor 
experiencing it first through his meeting with Grushenka and then through his vision of heaven facili-
tated by the reading of the passage about the miracle at the wedding feast in Cana of Galilee. What 
his head and heart have known are now experienced in every part of his body. Awaking from his 
dream, Alyosha goes outside and it is as if all of his senses are now infused with the knowledge of joy, 
empowering him to love:  
 
The vault of heaven, full of soft, shining stars, stretched vast and fathomless above him. The Milky Way ran in two 
pale streams from the zenith to the horizon. The fresh, motionless, still night enfolded the earth. The white towers 
and golden domes of the cathedral gleamed out against the sapphire sky. The gorgeous autumn flowers, in the 
beds round the house, were slumbering till morning. The silence of earth seemed to melt into the silence of the 
heavens. The mystery of earth was one with the mystery of the stars ... Alyosha stood, gazed, and suddenly threw 
himself down on the earth. He did not know why he embraced it. He could not have told why he longed so irresisti-
bly to kiss it, to kiss it all. But he kissed it weeping, sobbing and watering it with his tears, and vowed passionately 
to love it, to love it for ever and ever. „Water the earth with the tears of your joy and love those tears," echoed in 
his soul. (337-38)  
 
In his "The God of Onions: The Brothers Karamazov and the Mythic Prosaic" Gary Saul Morson 
elaborates on the spiritual significance of Alyosha's meeting with Grushenka and her tale of the wicked 
peasant woman almost rescued from hell by the onion she once gave to a beggar: "when Alyosha 
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returns from Grushenka's to the monastery, he feels joy, and joy itself reminds him of Father Zosima, 
who preached the small joys of life. Alyosha thinks, 'He who loves men loves their gladness, too' ... He 
was always repeating that it was one of his leading ideas" (116). As joy grows, it produces fruit mani-
festing itself in the physical and tangible while remaining firmly rooted in ideas. Alyosha reflects on his 
faith in the nature of Christ and his inexplicable joy is at once elucidated and transformed into a de-
termination to love. His ability to love is contrasted with Ivan's compassion for all of humanity. Ivan 
has not yet allowed joy to set him free; he is trapped, like the countess of Ambricourt, in his denial of 
responsibility. He longs to be the liberator rather than the liberated. Yet perceiving his own impotence 
he, as Morson writes, concludes that meaning cannot be found, but his conclusion does not follow. 
Meaning can be found, but not by theory. It comes not from the top down but from the bottom up, not 
by argument but by experience — the experience of active love, of sharing people's joy and exchang-
ing onions with them" (121). So ironically, Morson notes, "out of compassion he [Ivan] becomes the 
most profound misanthrope in world literature" (110). Ivan is so certain of the superiority of the In-
quisitor's plan and his own plan of what could be or should be that he is rendered incapable of rejoic-
ing in reality and thus immune to the risk of the unknown and completely impotent in face of the gar-
gantuan task of love. 
Bernanos's young priest articulates what he has learned about the true nature of this active love 
towards the end of his life saying "for I only succeed in small things, and when I am tried by anxiety, I 
am bound to say it is the small joys that release me" (293). He goes on to observe that "for human 
agony is beyond all an act of love" (294). He, like Alyosha, comes to perceive the greatest beauty in a 
moment of deep pain and understands that the battle is not his to win in any ultimate kind of sense. 
He can simply embrace the earth, the mundaneness of the present, admit its ecstasy and be set free 
to the unknown appointments of love where he can choose again and again to say yes. Ultimately the 
curate, like Alyosha, encounters that epitome of joy, the ability to love, even when it means loving his 
own weakness, even loving his diseased body. Even these he is empowered to greet with a firm yes. It 
is a reflection of the higher order of love, finally eradicating that pride which looks at reality from 
without rather than from within. Consummate joy is summarized in the closing lines of the novel: „Yet 
if pride could die in us, the supreme grace would be to love oneself in all simplicity — as one would 
love any one of those who themselves have suffered and loved in Christ" (296). Seeing and under-
standing who one is without trying to hide or escape from it effaces all need for pretense. In his ex-
tensive biography of the life and work of Bernanos, Hans Urs von Balthasar notes the uniqueness of 
this joyful ability to love: "for the deepest aspect of Christianity is God's love for the earth ... through 
his Incarnation he put himself in a position of demonstrating to his creatures this his suffering out of 
love" (191). Both Alyosha and the curate knew the truth of this Reality which was not satisfied with 
being the subject but made itself the object. Joy, rather than being the destination, is the starting 
point, the source of empowerment for moving on to ever greater heights through the risk of the un-
known and the pain of love.  
Yet Bernanos and Dostoyevsky do not leave us to digest the main courses of responsibility, risk 
and self-sacrificial love, nourishing and satisfying they may be, without the promise of some wine and 
dessert. At the very heart of the Brothers Karamazov, just after the death of Zosima, Dostoyevsky 
highlights the significance of the story of Christ's first miracle at Cana of Galilee in the gospel of John. 
Morson notes that "the story Father Paissy is now reading over the body, 'Cana of Galilee,' emphasizes 
the peculiar theology that regards Jesus as the bringer of small prosaic delights" (116). Peculiar in-
deed. What possible connection could there be between the death of a beloved spiritual mentor and 
the story of a wedding celebration? Yes, the beginning of joy is taking responsibility for oneself; yes, 
joy cannot be sustained without the courage to take risks; and yes, the consummate experience of joy 
is in loving another as one loves oneself. However, joy would not be joy without "small prosaic de-
lights," without the ability to generously bestow upon those we love the smoothness of silk, the 
sweetness of chocolate, the richness of wine, and indeed to enjoy it together with them. Christ does 
not merely take on our suffering, his love also compels him to delight in our pleasure. Thus are pain 
and joy, the macabre and the sensual forever inextricably intertwined. In his vision of heaven Alyosha 
hears Zosima tell him that "he has made Himself like into us from love and rejoices with us. He is 
changing the water into wine that the gladness of the guests may not be cut short" (337). This is a 
pleasure distinct from that of the avoidance of pain, from that of comfort and felicitous circumstances, 
although it encompasses them. This is a pleasure which is the fruit of resurrection, of intimate 
knowledge of death and of that eternal constant which continues on even past that dark curtain. Only 
this renders the small prosaic delights something sacred, something far more than passing sparks of 
empty hedonism. 
Thus, with a view to Zosima's own resurrection, there is perhaps nothing more fitting to read than 
the story of Christ's delight in the sensual pleasure of those he came to suffer for. Similarly, in Berna-
nos's Diary of a Country Priest, following the countess' death the curate of Ambricourt remembers with 
joy the hope and the peace that he was able to instill in her and of which she had written so ardently 
in her final letter to him. He speaks of his awe in the face of the uncanny possibility of being able to 
give something meaningful: "oh, miracle — thus to be able to give what we ourselves do not possess, 
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sweet miracle of our empty hands!" (180). He did not rejoice in his role in her eternal salvation alone, 
but also in the physical relief and delight that she was able to experience before her untimely death 
thanks to their moment of communion. Michael R. Tobin writes of this passage in his biography 
Georges Bernanos: The Theological Source of His Art that when in the central scene the priest rescues 
the countess from her despair, she rediscovers that "hope is the flesh of my flesh" (175). This hope 
was not merely for an intangible, non-corporeal existence, but one that began to take effect in the 
reality of flesh and blood where at once wounds ache and fester yet also where a kiss can send warm 
sensations. All the carnal pleasures of this life can only be truly savored as gifts either given to anoth-
er and born from responsibility, risk and self-sacrifice, or received from another who has undertaken 
the aforementioned on our behalf. The delights of the flesh are the children of joy. 
There remains yet an aspect of joy distinct from the satisfaction received from self-sacrificial love 
for others and the sharing of prosaic gifts, although it is indeed an integral part of these practices: the 
joy of community. Thirst for community is perhaps the innate driving force behind the search for joy 
as an experience, whether or not we are fully aware of it. This sense of community is not merely the 
assurance afforded by love that another will do whatever it takes to be with us, nor the luxurious com-
fort of gifts expressing affection, but the recognition that another is like us, that there is a mutual 
resemblance although not necessarily an obvious one. At the moment when he realizes that Alyosha is 
not so far removed from him as he imagined, the young boy Kolya exclaims: "oh, how I love you and 
admire you at this moment just because you are rather ashamed! Because you are just like me" 
(523). Dostoyevsky goes on to add that he said it "in positive ecstasy. His cheeks glowed, his eyes 
beamed" (523). Interestingly, the resemblance that Kolya perceived is not something related to a 
character trait he is particularly proud of or a cause he feels passionately about: it is a resemblance of 
weakness, an acknowledgement that Alyosha is vulnerable, too, and that although he does not try to 
hide it, he blushes to speak if it. What joy there is in seeing that another is open to and can be 
touched by pain just as much as we ourselves can. What unspeakable happiness and relief in recog-
nizing that another shares the burden of our guilt, that we are not the sole individual cause of all that 
is amiss in life. For Bernanos's curate of Ambricourt this community of shame, of guilt, or pain origi-
nates first of all in god and is only sustainable through him: "true pain coming out of a man belongs 
primarily to God, it seems to me. I try and take it humbly to my heart, just as it is. I endeavor to 
make it mine — to love it. And I understand all the hidden meaning of the expression which has be-
come hackneyed now: to commune with. Because I really 'commune' with his pain" (83). 
The fact that god chooses to resemble us in our shame and guilt, chooses to blush, hide his face, 
and feel the weight of crooked imperfection, this alone enables us to experience joy, connection, reci-
procity rather than despair and isolation in the face of our own or another's iniquity and/or suffering. 
Kolya sensed that Alyosha was no longer someone on the outside looking into him, but instead a fel-
low traveler in his inner world of pain, fear and unbearable self-reproach. In the same way, the curate 
experienced joy in knowing that his Master "not only judges our life but shares it, takes it upon Him-
self" (84). His mentor, the curate de Torcy speaks of the sense of helplessness that is at the heart of a 
child's joy, mirroring humanity's euphoric vulnerability in the face of divine incarnation: "but that very 
sense of powerlessness is the mainspring of a child's joy. He just leaves it all to his mother, you see. 
Present, past, future — his whole life is caught up in one look, and that look is a smile" (18-19). The 
child recognizes three crucial truths: an utter dependence upon the mother, resemblance to the one 
he is dependent upon, and the goodness of the mother reflected in her smile. The curate asserts that 
this sense of utter dependence, made possible through absolute trust, is the source of joy. Like Kolya, 
every child yearns to be unconditionally accepted by one who is at the same time in essence as they 
are and can yet take care of them and not betray them. These comprise the foundation of the joy of 
community. 
For Dostoyevsky and Bernanos joy has its source in something wholly other than human will, expe-
rience, or imagination. It is only through a relational acknowledgment of the other, higher absolute 
that joy could begin to grow and be known in its many facets, liberating the heroes from disorder, 
giving them the courage to take risks and empowering them to love. The curate of Ambricourt finds in 
Christ the source of his joy, Christ, who had the power to do anything he wanted but chose to take all 
responsibility and all risk, sacrificing even his life so that humans could savor the delights of prosaic 
gifts and find solace in true community with god and each other. Towards the end of his life, thinking 
of Christ's example, the curate is even able to find joy in community with his enemies: "even from the 
Cross, when Our Lord in His agony found the perfection of His saintly Humanity — even then He did 
not own Himself a victim of injustice ... and so I find great joy in thinking that much of the blame, 
which sometimes hurt me, arose from a common ignorance of my true destiny" (292). In recognizing 
his likeness to the Savior, the curate is able to perceive his likeness to his enemies and even in this 
there is joy. In one of his notebooks Dostoyevsky wrote of the joy of sacrificial love made possible by 
knowledge of and community with Christ: "I define Orthodoxy not by mystical beliefs but by love of 
humanity, and I rejoice in this" (Dostoyevsky qtd. in Scanlan 55). In his A Writer's Diary, Dostoyevsky 
noted that "in Russian, genuine Christianity, there is no mysticism at all; in it there is only love for 
humanity, only the image of Christ — at least that is the main thing" (Dostoyevsky qtd. in Scanlan 
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55). Seeing Christ, allowing him to immerse in one's being when face-to-face with him, was for Dosto-
yevsky the very core of joy for it transformed one's whole outlook. It is this intimate knowledge of 
Christ which is central in the final scene of The Brothers Karamazov: when the boy Kolya asks in-
credulously about the reality of the resurrection at the graveside of their friend Ilyusha, Alyosha 
Karamazov enthusiastically responds, "certainly we shall all rise again, certainly we shall see each 
other and shall tell each other with joy and gladness all that has happened!' Alyosha answered, half 
laughing, half enthusiastic" (728). As in the case of the curate of Ambricourt, sharing such a measure 
of community with Christ so as to even become like him, allows Alyosha, Kolya, and the other boys to 
find joy in the realization of their own inevitable mortality. This is the joy Dostoyevsky and Bernanos 
deemed worthy of desiring: a joy which affords triumph even in the face of apparent defeat before our 
enemies and the surety of our own demise, a joy which allows our lives to overflow with simple yet 
profound gifts, and enables the experience of true community, although it may come by way of heavy 
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